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Abstract
Tablighi Jamaat is one of the world’s largest and most successful transnational Is-
lamic movements with established branches built on the business of dakwa (pros-
elytization) in approximately 180 countries. Tablighi’s strong commitment to a 
style of dakwa based on their reformist attitude and   exible practice of mazhab 
(schools of thought) through a process of ‘demazhabizasi’ (demahzhabization), 
has attracted interest from a range of people. Tablighi guarantees the freedom 
for its members to embrace their choice of mazhab, and prefers its proselytizers 
to follow the mazhab of the communities in which they preach in order to avoid 
religious debates.  is article aims to understand the concept of ‘demazhabisasi’ 
that has developed in Tablihgi and the ways in which Tablighi members work 
to overcome and prevent con  ict due to the diff erent understandings of each 
mazhab.  e material sacri  ces Tablighi proselytizers make together with their 
reliance on and submission to God for their economy, has led this research to 
examine the concept of a ‘divine economy’ that has developed in Tablighi com-
munities. Yet, behind Tablighi’s apparent success, con  ict has emerged internally 
among Tablighi members, as well as externally among locals in the communi-
ties in which Tablighi proselytizers work.  is research uses an ethnographic ap-
proach to explore narratives of con  ict that have emerged as a result of Tablighi 
proselytizing practices in Samarinda, East Kalimantan.
Keywords:  e Tablighi, demazhabization, economy of divinity and narrative 
con  ict
INTRODUCTION
 e transnational political-dakwa movement led by the Tablighi follower 
group, Hizb ut-Tahrir, Wahabis, Ahmadis and the Muslim Brotherhood has 
been growing in the last four decades and had a strong in  uence ideologically 
in many countries. Among the transnational movements, the Tablighi group 
has been the most ‘successful’ for a while as it is capable of existing and being 
consistent with their militant dakwa movement, ‘sala  ’ and globalized. Despite 
having a clear organizational structure like other community organizations, 
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institutions or political parties, the Tablighi movement is very well organized, 
disciplined and orderly, using consensus to make decisions (Abdurrahman 
Ahmad As-Syirbuni, 2010).  e Tablighi has branches in 180 countries spread 
across the continents with approximately 80 million members.  e Tablighi’s 
success as a global dakwa movement is controversial in the community.  e 
Tablighi has also been aff ected by the political movement of global terrorism 
in which it, by some Western researchers, is seen as sponsor of jihadists in the 
bombing cases in Britain, United States and France (Muhammad Amira Rana, 
2009). Even Fred Burton and Scott Stewart claimed that  e Tablighi had a 
secret latent network with terrorist groups in Pakistan (Joshua W. Hedges, 
2008).  is claim requires further proof because the Tablighi’s culture and 
discourse are diff erent from country to country so it should not be generalized. 
During my   eld study in Samarinda and Balikpapan, for example, I never heard 
of a member of  e Tablighi discussing political issues, violence or racism 
campaign against the West that became the parameters to decide whether or 
not it was part of a terrorist group.
 e headquarters (markas) is a center for the Tablighi activities, in which all 
members gather to attend the bayan religious lecture once a week and hold 
a meeting to discuss the dakwa agenda and evaluate its opportunities and 
challenges.  e place used as the headquarters is usually a mosque which 
is designed not only for worship but also for the Tablighi dakwa center.  e 
mosque plays an important role in the practice of  e Tablighi religious rituals; 
without it, the Tablighi would be unable to perform preaching activities (Fikri 
Rivai, 2010).  eir mission is to strengthen the faith and deeds of Muslims 
through prayers in mosques.  e mosque grandeur is not important to the 
Tablighi, but enlivening the mosque for religion.  e Tablighi mosque also 
serves as a pesantren (Islamic boarding school) for Quranic studies ranging 
from children to teenagers.  e Tah  z Pesantren is one of the Tablighi 
pesantren education identity.  e latest trend among  e Tablighi families 
in Samarinda is to send their children to the Tah  z pesantren with leaving 
formal education.
Tablighi is growing rapidly in Southeast Asia, including Indonesia, Singapore, 
 ailand, Brunei, and Malaysia.  e Tablighi’s presence in Southeast Asia has 
given a new color in the pattern of local Asian religious communities (Faris 
A. Noor, 2012).  e Tablighi movement has become an ‘alternative’ dakwa 
movement to bring new interpretations and patterns of more egalitarian and 
non-hierarchical dakwa between clerics with worshipers (Ariesta, 2009). 
Tablighi provides more space for the community to develop the potential of 
their teachings, so that everyone is not only a loyal listener, but also plays 
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an active role as a preacher inside and outside the Tablighi.  is is what 
distinguishes the Tablighi to other community organizations, where only 
clerics are entitled to hold the authority to teach in their communities. Seeing 
new patterns and systems, people from the outside of Tablighi claim that 
the Tablighi preachers are ignorant because they do not know the science of 
Islam (Abdurrahman Ahmad As-Syirbuni, 2010).  e Tablighi group makes 
a new step in the recruitment of members by putting aside diff erences in 
sects and cults of each member.  is concept is what the author refers to as 
‘demazhabization’ of Islam, i.e. releasing Islam from the grip of the culture of 
schools of thought.
 is article explores the concept of ‘demazhabization’ of Islam that developed 
within the Tablighi and how they accommodate diff erences of schools 
of thought internally and how they manage con  icts arising from these 
diff erences.  e issue of schools of thought has become a global issue because 
it is positioned as a doctrine or ideology to be followed as a whole and should 
not be mixed with other schools. Problems arise when a group with a particular 
school of thought blames the others.  ey desperately defend their schools as 
the ‘most right’. As a result, friction and con  ict cannot be controlled, even it 
is not uncommon to end up with violence and sectarian war (Saipul Hamdi, 
2011). Con  ict of schools of thought may turn increasingly sensitive when 
political and economic interests are involved, especially as it is used as a 
school of thought adopted by the state to legitimize the rule as in Saudi Arabia 
and Brunei Darussalam (Tim Ahlul Bait Indonesia, 2012). Demazhabization 
pattern by the Tablighi in addition to receiving a positive response from the 
Muslim communities in Indonesia (NU, Muhammadiyah, Persis and NW), it 
also got a strong criticism from the Wahhabis because it disclaims discourse 
and theology in their academic culture.   is arises because the Tablighi avoid 
the discourse and debate containing khila  yah, but prioritize worship and 
dakwa.
 e Tablighi dakwa challenge is not only related to the issue of school of 
thought, but also in the approach of dakwa they adopt. Some residents feel 
uncomfortable with their visit, knocking at the door to deliver one or two 
verses.  is, to some people violates the privacy and freedom of religion 
as prayer is personal responsibility.  is approach o en results in con  ict 
with local communities. Another issue that arises is related to the Tablighi’s 
responsibility in ensuring economic prosperity of their family because of the 
need to dakwa. Financial constraints force members of the Tablighi to sell the 
property in order to meet the needs of preaching, but they continue to remain 
committed to Allah. For them, Allah is the source and giver of sustenance.  e 
[  150  ]
AL ALBAB - Borneo Journal of Religious Studies (BJRS) Volume 4 Number 2 December 2015
concept of not caring about the material and submit all economic problems to 
Allah brings further questions about the economic concept of ‘divinity’ built 
by members of the Tablighi and economic impact on families.
TABLIGHI FOLLOWERS IN SAMARINDA
Before discussing the description of Tablighi followers in Samarinda, the 
author will give a brief pro  le of the city of Samarinda. Samarinda is derived 
from the word ‘equal’ and ‘low’, which means there is no diff erence in social 
status in public life in this city both for migrants and natives.  e word ‘similar’ 
and ‘low’ then changed the spelling to Samarinda.   e city was named by 
the king of Kutai to maintain the stability and harmony of the whole tribe, 
language, and religion in this town.  e city of Samarinda was a Bugis Wajo 
village built in order to seek political asylum from the king of Kutai in 1668 
as a result of the defeat of the king of Gowa from the Dutch.  e king of Kutai 
initially gave the agricultural land of Karang Mumus with an agreement that 
Daeng Mangkona and his followers will help the king against the Dutch who 
began to enter into the kingdom. 
Samarinda is the capital of the province of East Kalimantan which is directly 
bordered by Kutai Kertanegara Regncy. Samarinda has an area of 718.00 km 
with an entrance through the Mahakam river. At the end of 2010, Samarinda 
was divided into 10 sub-districts with the highest population density in East 
Kalimantan which reached 805.688 followers, 416.975 men and 388.713 
women. Samarinda population was dominated by the trans-migrants from 
Java (29.55%), Bugis (18.26%), Banjar (13.94%), Dayak (9.91), Kutai (9.21), 
Toraja (1.96), Madura (1.24) and Chinese (1.16). the indigenous majority 
(Dayak) live in the upstream region inland away from the life of modernity. 
Only a small proportion lives in cities and take part in the elections of governor 
or regent / mayor. One of the Dayak   gures, Syahari Ja’ang, was elected Mayor 
of Samarinda in the period of 2010-2015 (BPS, 2014).
Based on data obtained from Samarinda Religious Ministry Offi  ce, religions 
in Samarinda include Islam with 700.234 followers (90.94%), Protestantism 
40.086 followers (5:20%), Catholicism 17.290 followers (of 2.25%), Buddha 
8.295 followers (1:08%), and Hindu 1,052 followers (0:14% ).   e relationship 
between religious groups in Samarinda is quite harmonious, away from the 
issue of con  ict and social violence. Each of these religious communities 
coexists freely to practice tolerance.  e Lempake area that serves as the 
headquarters of Tablighi followers consists of three centers, namely Al-
Mubarok (Headquarters Tablighi), Catholic Center and Buddhist Center.  e 
three religious groups compete fairly with no friction or sectarian con  ict. 
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Local governments have an important role in establishing harmony between 
religions by providing worship facilities proportionately. In 2009, the number 
of mosques in Samarinda was 810 and the number of churches 71.  e Islamic 
Center Mosque Samarinda is the largest mosque in East Kalimantan with an 
area of 43,500 meters.
Religious activities go hand in hand with the development of industry and 
modernity in Samarinda. Modernity and religion need no con  ict, but can 
go along together and complement each other in public life of Samarinda. 
Mosques and prayer rooms are never devoid of religious activities, as well 
as shopping malls and entertainment places. Islam in Samarinda consists of 
various sects carried by the clerics of Banjar, Javanese, Bugis, Lombok and 
Madura.  e Banjarese domininate the mosques in Samarinda as ta’mir 
and preachers. One characteristic of Islamic clerics of Banjar is that before 
the sermon, Habsi traditional music is performed (singing and shalawat 
accompanied by kasidah music). Islamic organizations from outside the 
region are also growing rapidly in Samarinda like NU, Muhammadiyah, 
LDII, Hizb ut-Tahrir Indonesia and the Tablighi.  e Tablighi followers in 
East Kalimantan were brought in by the preachers of Java and Sulawesi in the 
1980s. the development of Tablighi doctrine is signi  cant in East Kalimantan, 
where members are approximately 8000 people from all walks of life ranging 
from academics, employees, merchants, offi  cials, farmers and thugs.
 e Tablighi followers in Samarinda are approximately 1,000 people spread in 
20 Mahallas (mosque).  e activity centers at the headquarters of Al-Mubarok 
Mosque, on Lempake Road, Northern Samarinda, where all Ahbab or karkun 
gather to listen to the bayan every Friday night. A er the Bayan, they discuss 
the activities that will be carried out primarily Khuruj program, then continue 
with dinner.  e headquarters of Al-Mubarok also has Tah  z Al-Quran 
boarding school for female students coached by Ustaz Maulana Arif, whereas 
for male boarding school, it is built in the area Pampang, Tanah Merah 
approximately 5 km from the headquarters. In addition,  Tah  z Al-Quran 
of the Tablighi has also been opened in the residential area of Bukit Pinang 
under the guidance of Ustaz Nizar.  e new headquarters built for the area 
Samarinda is the Tablighi mosque of Sungai Siring an area of approximately 
6 ha.  e Tablighi headquarters in the mosque Al-Mubarok will be moved to 
the mosque in Sungai Siring because of its bigger capacity.
BUILDING A NEW THAREQAT FOR SOCIAL AWARENESS
Each mazhab in Islam has a speci  c methodology of interpreting the 
teachings of Islam. Wahabism is known for their ‘sala  ’, HTI ‘for the khilafah’ 
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Muhammadiyah for ‘renewal’, Hidayatullah for ‘Qur’an’ NU for ‘Azwaja’, 
Ahmadiyah for ‘Mesiah’, Shiites for ‘imamah’ and the Tablighi for ‘preaching’. 
 e Tablighi founder, Sheikh Ilyas formulated a new methodology known as 
 areqat Nabawi.  areqat Nabawi is a thareqat that emphasizes on preaching 
exempli  ed by the Prophet and his companions in the early history of Islam. 
To revive  areqat Nabawi, the outlines of the rules of preaching known as 
‘orderly’ should be made so as to regulate the activities of both dakwa and 
technical concepts that must be followed by the congregation when becoming 
a member.  is ‘orderly’ rule is a general agreement that must be executed 
with sincerity, discipline and total submission in order to obtain a perfect 
result (Abdurrahman Ahmad As-Syirbuni, 2010).
 e new methodology of which is constructed by the Tablighi is not widely 
understood by the public.  e thareqat nabawi dakwa method popularized by 
Sheikh Ilyas has a clear lineage from Prophet Muhammad, Companions and 
scholars of Su  . I argue that the dakwa movement the Tablighi is part of ‘neo-
conservative’ Su  sm, the movement that strives to maintain the old traditions, 
but at the same time creates new contextual elements. Muhammad Amir 
called Rana Ilyas Sheikh dakwa movement as reform Su  sm (Muhammad 
Amir Rana, 2009). Many old traditions are preserved until today, for example 
the Prophet’s militancy in preaching and how to position religion as a business 
area, and they also create new patterns such as Khuruj    sabilillah which takes 
3 days, 40 days or 4 months (Husen Usman Kambayang, 2009; Christopher 
Deliso, 2007).
 e  areqat Nabawi introduced by Sheikh Ilyas is a combination of four 
thareqats i.e. Al-Jistiyah, Naqsabandiyah, Qadariyah and As-Sharowardiyah, 
which was then modi  ed to emphasize on dakwa.  Sheikh Ilyas did not agree 
with the concept of the ‘conventional’ thareqat, where members just sit doing 
wirid, tafakkur and heal themselves instead of helping the community. He saw 
the importance of preaching while practicing the teachings thareqat together 
in mosques through Khuruj    sabilillah program. Muslims need to sacri  ce 
for the religion, not just sitting alone while the communities are in a state of 
weak faith. Da’wah should be sustainable even if only done brie  y (Yonginder 
Sikand, 2007).  e slogan used is ‘deliver about religion even if only one verse’. 
 is is the reference used by the Tablighi in building their epistemology of 
dakwa methodology.
In order to maintain continuity in the public dakwa, the Tablighi design a 
Khuruj    sabi lillah program. Khuruj is one of the methods of the program of 
the Tablighi dakwa. Khuruj comes from the Arabic meaning going out, this 
term is then used in the context of preaching out in the community. Khuruj 
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spirit is drawn from the event of Prophet Muhammad’s migration to Medina 
when spreading Islam (Marloes Janson, 2014). All members of the Tablighi 
are encouraged to do Khuruj in order to establish the character of religiosity. 
Khuruj can be done for 3 days, 40 days and 4 months with the basic concept 
that 10% of the time is used for religion.  e 10% count covers three days 
in a month, 40 days a year and 4 months for a life time.  Khuruj of 3 days is 
performed at the level of khalaqah in mosques in the village or district level, 
and 40 days in mosques across the province, while four months is usually 
in one of the Tablighi centers, namely India, Pakistan and Bangladesh (IPB). 
If you’ve been out to one of IPB, the members of the Tablighi is deemed 
spiritually mature and could be preaching to the distant land.
Khuruj activity is equal to ‘solitude’ in the concept of Su  sm that is alienating 
oneself from the life of the world and focus on running the worship of Allah. 
Although the term Khuruj is diff erent from the ‘solitude’, it essentially has 
similar nature, alienating the heart and soul away from the worldly life. In 
the Al-Quran it is told that ‘solitude’ was done by ashabul kah   for hundreds 
of years in the cave, the prophet Moses on the hill of Tursina for 40 days, the 
prophet Muhammad in the cave hira and the Su   scholars to the mountains 
to seek the truth (Muhammad Sholikhin, 2009).  e Tablighi do not use the 
term ‘solitude’, but instead use Khuruj    sabilillah where they do not retreat to 
the cave, but to mosques and still establish communication with the outside 
community around for the sake of dakwa. During my three days of Khuruj 
in the mosque Palaran, Samarinda, all members had to pray in congregation 
at all times and should not be out of the mosque without permission of the 
amir. We woke up in the middle of the night to perform tahajjud prayer, dawn 
prayer and to listen to the bayan for 15-30 minutes.
In addition to bayan, the congregation also held a book study on Fadhoilul 
Amal written by Sheikh Maulana Zakaria essay.  e taklim was delivered 
alternately by reciting certain chapters in the book Fadhoilul Amal. In the 
late a ernoon before sunset some members did jaulah, traveling to homes 
to perform dakwa.  ey knocked at the door, introduced themselves and 
delivered the purpose of preaching.  ey invited people to evening prayers 
in congregation to listen to the bayan until evening prayer (Abdurrahman 
Ahmad AsSyirbuni, 2010). Not all members participate in the jaulah, mostly 
staying in the mosque doing study groups, remembrance and pray for success 
of jaulah.  ose who did the jaulah divided the role as a dalil, a guide, usually 
the Tablighi members of the local village, mutakallim, spokesman, and 
makmur. Before leaving for jaulah, the group prayed in front of the mosque 
standing in a circle. Each visit took only 3-5 minutes to catch the quantity and 
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avoided talking about topics outside religion.
During Khuruj the Tablighi also had a program to meet scholars around the 
region. Silaturrahmi aims to pay homage to the scholars and build ukhuwah 
Islamiyah network. When a Khuruj entourage from Sri Lanka in Balikpapan 
visited Ar-Rahman mosque, I accompanied the group to visit Al-Mujahideen 
pesantren.  e delegation of the Tablighi began to introduce themselves 
and delivered the preaching mission to leader of the pesantren. What is 
interesting was that the Tablighi leader and the kyai was of the same Al-
Jistiyah thareqat. Both of them could match the deeds of each other, although 
there were diff erences because of diff erent versions practiced.  e Kyai invited 
the group to take a photograph together as a memento, but was respectfully 
rejected because it is not part of Sunnah.  e next day, we had silaturrahmi 
to Pesantren of Syekh Muhammad Arsyad Al-Banjari under leadership of Al- 
Syarwani Zuhri Al-Banjari in Balikpapan.  is pesantren is one of the largest 
boarding schools in Samarinda with students numbering in hundreds.  e 
Pesantren leaders are alumni of Madrasa Shaulatiyah of Mecca and Madrasa 
in Khadramaut Yaman.  e dakwa of the Tablighi was welcomed by the kyai, 
even if they could not participate directly because of their busy schedule at 
the Pesantren. For two hours they were sharing experiences as a leader of 
Pesantren using Arabic.
During Khuruj, the entourage also visited hospitals and prisons.  is program 
aims to promote hospital visit and pray for their dakwa in order to quickly 
recover from illness or die in a state of being a faithful Muslim. When I joined 
Khuruj for 3 days in the Mangku Palas mosque, Samarinda Seberang, I visited 
the Abdul Muis hospital. When we arrived, we asked for permission to visit 
the in-patients. We were divided into 2 groups and visited patients in diff erent 
rooms. We introduced ourselves and prayed for the patients’ recovery. A visit 
to the hospital was temporary according to local needs, not the teachings of 
the Tablighi center.  e case in Samarinda, for example, the congregation 
was concerned with the dakwa movement in the Catholic hospital, where 
the pastor prays for dying Muslim patients.  e followers of Tabligi worry 
that unconscious patients may be persuaded to abandon their faith by the 
clergy.  erefore, to   ght the dakwa movement in this hospital, the Tablighi 
consistently visit the hospital. Another social program is visiting prison 
inmates for preaching.  e presence of members of the Tablighi in the prison 
is quite interesting because not many preachers go directly to the correction 
center.  e Tablighi see a big opportunity to preach in prisons.  e entourage 
at the time visited prison class II A on Awang Long street, Samarinda. We 
were welcomed by prison offi  cers and were provided an opportunity to meet 
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and preach to the prisoners.
“DEMAZHABIZATION” OF ISLAM: INTEGRATION OF THE OF LO
CAL AND GLOBAL SCHOOLS OF THOUGHT
 e emergence of the dakwa movement, the Tablighi, in the early 20th 
century in India has brought major changes to the development of Islamic 
dakwa movement.  e Tablighi have been able to reach the rapidly growing 
number of 10 million followers in 180 countries  e Tablighi’s existence not 
only initiates a new approach to dakwa, but also emerges as an alternative 
movement that off ers an alternative in the midst of tension and rigidity of 
the relation between Islamic mazhabs in which they are trapped in the war 
and prison of mazhab (school of thought) (George Abraham Maksidi, 2000). 
 e phenomenon of mazhab has shackled the Muslims a er the schools of 
thought became dogma and doctrine in the early 10th century.  e results of 
the ijtihad were regarded as ‘sacred’ and ‘taboo’ to be criticized. Sincretization 
of mazhab is deemed as a deviation of religion, but mazhabs are not more than 
a product of ijtihad interpretation of the scholars of Islamic theology, law and 
politics.  ere are 8 schools recognized in Islam; Hana  , Maliki, Sha  ’i and 
Hanbali (Sunni) and Ja’fari, Ibadi and Zaidi (Shiite) (Charles Mwalimu, 2007). 
 e problem is that each of the mazhab adherents believes that they are the 
most correct.  is attitude is not only growing in the discourse, but also in 
social practices that lead to con  ict and violence.
 e phenomenon of prison of mazhab in the Islamic community has been a 
tradition, ingrained and diffi  cult to remove. Diff erences of mazhab o en lead 
to con  ict and social violence, let alone ridden with political and economic 
interests such as Sunni and Shiite con  ict (Iraq, Iran, Afghanistan, Syria, and 
Pakistan), and political con  icts of the Muslim Brotherhood (Egypt, Lebanon 
and Jordan). In Indonesia, the con  ict between adherents of the mazhab is 
latent and continues to reproduce and escalate  such as con  icts between NU 
and Muhammadiyah, NU and Wahabi, Ahmadiyah and FPI (Saipul Hamdi, 
2014).  e existence of mazhabs with diff erences of identity does not mutually 
reinforce each other, but rather mutually weakens each other.
I found the concept of ‘demazhabization’ developed by the Tablighi has given 
a new color in the construction harmonious social relations and also as an 
alternative to unite Muslims at a local and global level.  ere are two meanings 
contained in an eff ort of ‘demazhabization’, i.e,   rst, that the Tablighi does not 
recognize the existence of other mazhab. Secondly, the Tablighi acknowledge 
all mazhabs but should not be discussed and handed it to each congregation. 
 e movement of ‘demazhabization’ can unite Muslims in the frame of a more 
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universal and also free them from the mazhab prison because they prioritize 
individual freedom to choose schools of thought which   t them and do 
not force others to follow their mazhab. Attempts of ‘demazhabization’ are 
implemented in the teachings of the Tablighi that should not be touched, one 
of them talking about ‘khila  yah’, let alone talking about their mazhab in front 
of other congregations (Maulana Muhammad Yusuf Alkandhalawi, 2008). 
When becoming a member of the Tablighi, the congregation must ‘undress’ 
their mazhab and receive the clothes that the other mazhab.
Plurality of mazhab and sects in Islam is a social reality that must be accepted 
gracefully and does not need to be questioned. Moreover, Prophet Muhammad 
had predicted a split in Islam in his Hadith as many as 73 groups (Saipul Hamdi, 
2011). Muslims biggest homework now is how to manage and accommodate 
groups of mazhab in order to integrate and work together to promote dakwa 
of Islam. Poor management of mazhab has a major impact on social friction 
and con  ict, especially the grassroots who do not understand the depth of the 
discourse and the origin of mazhab or known ‘blind fanaticism’. Founder of 
the Tablighi was well aware of the major issues and off ered a middle way to 
resolve it.  ere are four things that should not be touched in order to defend 
the Islamic Ummah, i.e. to discuss political issues both inside and outside the 
country, to discuss khila  yah, to discuss the abominations of society, and to 
discuss the status and funding. To the Tablighi, discussing the diff erences of 
mazhab has no meaning, and simply divides the ummah, and leads to Islamic 
dakwa never reaching its full potential (Husen Usman Kambayang, 2009).
Sheikh Ilyas seeked to eliminate discourse ‘khila  yah’ in the Tablighi by 
promoting basic teachings such as prayers, studying, respect for others, and 
preaching.  e basic teachings of Islam are summed up in six properties 
i.e. the sentence of toyyibah (shahada), shalat khusu’ wal ‘khudu’, ilmu ma’a 
dzikir, ikromul muslimin, tash-hihun niyyah, da’wah wat tabligh (Maulana 
Muhammad Yusuf Alkandhalawi, 2008).  e toyyibah sentence ‘asyhadu alla 
ilaha illallah’ aims to bring con  dence to the human heart and put faith only 
in Allah.  is toyyibah sentence in the Tablighi’s view is a sentence that is as 
strong as a uni  er of human beings, especially the Muslims. When one says the 
toyyibah sentence, then no screen, hijab or the distance between them.  is 
sentence can unite the whole tribes, nations, languages, classes, community 
organizations, mazhabs and classes in the frame of humanism and surrender 
to Allah.
 e uni  cation of the various mazhabs in the Tablighi is not as easy as it looks, 
in which each member must adapt to patterns of relationship and interaction 
of new and accepting diff erences without asking or questioning the members 
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of other mazhabs.  e adaptation process takes a long time because it has 
been an entrenched practice of debate and con  ict discourse of mazhab. For 
example, when one member of the Tablighi of Mecca perform Khuruj at the 
headquarters of Al-Mubarok Samarinda performing the bayan, he is not aware 
of discussing the khila  yah by issuing the view of Wahhabism and blames 
other teaching practices.  is action lead to scolding by the local congregation 
who would ask him to stop the discussion of ‘khila  yah’ as it is uncomfortable 
and may create con  ict.  e sensitive issue of mazhab diff erences among 
Muslims, including among the Tablighi, will only takes up energy to argue 
and justify each mazhab to be the most correct.
Negotiations of socio-religious space within the Tablighi are naturally 
and culturally constructed within the frame of brotherhood.  e Tablighi 
emphasize ‘ikromul muslimin’, in honor of fellow Muslims by grounding the 
toyyibah sentence. Whenever they perform jaulah, congregations greet the 
public with toyyibah sentence. As did Sheikh Muhammad Taslim of Sri Lanka, 
when he met residents in Balikpapan he hugged and kissed his le  cheek and 
right while smiling and saying the toyyibah sentence.
“Assalamua’alaikum, subhanallah we are brought together by Allah here. We 
are brothers and united with the toyyibah sentence “La ilaha illallah”. We 
came all the way from Sri Lanka to preach and encourage fellow Muslims to 
establish the religion of Allah with the   ve daily prayers in congregation and 
listen to the bayan a er sunset. Insha Allah, our meeting has been recorded by 
Allah and there will be later in heaven exactly what is happening today. Insh 
Allah together we pray in congregation a er sunset, Insha Allah Insha Allah.
Granting freedom to all members of the Tablighi in the practice of mazhab 
and following local mazhab in the preaching gives a big advantage for the 
smooth dakwa process.  e society, getting fed up with the con  ict as a result 
of diff erences in the interpretation of mazhab, seems to   nd something new 
in the Tablighi. A phenomenon that arises is the strong currents of integration 
and interconnection between the ‘local’ and ‘global’ mazhab. Tabighi dakwa 
activities across the region and the country are part of the globalization and 
localization of Islam. Every week, month and year, the congregations visit each 
other (khuruj) alternately from one region or country to another. Meanwhile, 
I met with congregations from Saudi Arabia, Sri Lanka,  ailand, Bangladesh, 
and the congregation of Samarinda performed Khuruj to Malaysia, Japan, 
India,  ailand and Pakistan. In their dakwa, the Tablighi not only integrate 
the mazhab, but also the culture, traditions, and local and global languages. 
No stranger to the local congregation to hear the bayans in Urdu, Arabic, Sri 
Lankan, and English, but they remain focused’.
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‘DIVINITY’ ECONOMY AND WIFE INDEPENDENCE IN   
THE TABLIGHI 
 e Tablighi dakwa eff orts through Khuruj    sabilillah is the toughest 
program that generates a lot of controversy in the community. Khuruj requires 
con  dence and sincerity to sacri  ce much more not only time, labor, family, 
but also the economy. Khuruj requires considerable cost for transport and 
meals during the dakwa. Meanwhile each member must provide their own 
costs, including transportation and meals.  e Tablighi do not have a sponsor 
and do not collaborate with any institution, including the government, so it is 
incorrect to say that the Tablighi dakwa is free. When there are members who 
help other members to bear travel costs, it is only in certain cases. However, 
senior members are so concerned about new members who want to go out for 
dakwa and usually they will provide a way out.
 e accommodation during dakwa is not a problem because they sleep in 
mosques.  ey will move from one mosque to another. Congregations from 
abroad will receive free meal, all borne by the local congregation alternately. 
 e provision of food for the congregations from abroad is because it has a 
lot of sacri  ces that need to get help from another congregation. In contrast 
to the congregations who travel out of districts or provinces have to pay 
dues for meals between IDR 10,000-20,000 per day according to the results 
of deliberations. Khuruj is not only done once, but repeatedly and will have 
an impact on the existence and stability of the family’s economy.  en the 
next question is the extent of Khuruj economic impact on the family and 
how the concept of economic development of families is constructed in the 
neighborhood the Tablighi?
Khuruj will not increase property or materially bene  cial, but in reality it will 
reduce the wealth and family income because of decreased work productivity 
dramatically.  e husband who was once so productive and had high 
obsession to collect money, a er joining the spirit the Tablighi would change 
completely because they put religious matters above everything. Religion for 
the Tablighi is not a mere ritual, but the business   elds that need to be worked 
out and disseminated sustainably so that people gain insight and spiritual 
transformation. One can imagine that members who perform Khuruj could 
come from the lower classes do not have enough resources to face economic 
hardship for themselves and their families le  behind. I argue that Khuruj    
sabilillah has a major impact on the economic condition of the family of the 
Tablighi. Most members have experienced decreased   nancial income, some 
families even experienced economic crisis.
Several cases in the   eld interesting to see are among others how they negotiate 
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the socio-economic conditions of their families with dakwa mission. Adnan, a 
member of theTablighi congregation of Balikpapan explained that he did not 
have enough money to pay for his khuruj trip. He then borrowed money from 
his family in order to cover the costs and expenses of meals during Khuruj in 
East Java. As for the money le  for the family at home was not enough so his 
wife had trouble, but he was con  dent that Allah will help them. Fortunately, 
the other congregations helped with the family’s daily needs at home, such as 
rice, spending money, etc. Ihsan, a new member of the Tablighi Samarinda 
directly went out for dakwa leaving his business behind. His wife who was 
not ready to accept this condition was quite stressed out having to handle the 
business and taking care of the children. Ihsan’s business was on the brink of 
collapse because it was not taken cared od properly. Akrom, a congregation 
from Sulawesi said that he had to sell household appliances for khuruj. His 
wife who was not ready to accept the fact, immediately attacked him. However, 
facing severe problems in the family did not stop Akrom from his struggle in 
path of Allah. A er being le  for 40 days doing dakwa outside Java, his wife 
survived and began to accept her husband’s decision. Jumadil, a congregation 
from Lombok sold beef cattle to meet the costs Khuruj abroad. Another 
member, Rahman, mortgaged his rice   eld for dakwa abroad because he had 
no money for travel expenses. Of all these cases, it shows the principle that 
they were ready to sacri  ce for Allah and what is sacri  ced shall be rewarded 
multiplied in number.  e Tablighi adhere to the verse ‘if you help the religion 
of Allah, then Allah will help you’.
 e belief that serves as the principle and ideology of those who are not 
worried about the economic conditions and surrender all matters of family 
life only to Allah is what I call “divinity economy”. “Divinity economy” is an 
economic concept that centers on Allah. Although not all members of the 
Tablighi have the same view of ‘divinity economiy’, but most informants I 
interviewed held the concept of ‘divinity economy’ as their family’s economic 
design. Extreme views in the economic concept of divinity contend that 
God will provide sustenance for them even though they have no job.  ey 
believe that Allah will give them an easier path and suffi  cient livelihood if they 
perform khuruj. Allah will ensure their families le  behind during Khuruj 
will have good health, safety and economy. To the Tablighi, Allah is the source 
of everything, a source of pleasure, happiness, and property (Abdurrahman 
Ahmad AsSyirbuni, 2010). However, they do not negate the existence of the 
trials and challenges from Allah.  e next question is whether the concept of 
‘divinity economy’ is a form of escape from their inability to seek sustenance or 
even a solution to the economic crisis by the Tablighi family when perfoming 
khuruj.
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In the teachings of Su  , attitude that does not care about the worldly material 
is called the ‘zuhud’ (Ro  atul Ulya, 2003). Humans do not have the strength 
to resist or refuse the provision of the will and power of Allah. Allah will li  
anyone he wants and let fall whom he wills. From this concept the Tablighi 
gave their life totally to the religion and sacri  ce in the path of Allah. Despite 
the fact that there are some who have to sell his property for khuruj, and some 
who borrow from the family, it is all considered a path or the trials of life that 
must be faced.  ey believe the more they go out for dakwa, the easier the 
matters with material or worldly aff airs.  e concept of ‘Divinity economy’ 
has been ingrained in most members of the Tablighi doctrine and is diffi  cult 
to change.
To minimize the economic issues at the level of families le  behind during 
dakwa, the Tablighi create a program called ‘nusroh’. Nusroh comes from the 
word nasharo meaning ‘to help’, in this context helping people abandoned by 
their families. Nushroh pattern is modeled on the Prophet’s dakwa that divided 
the role of Muslims as the Ansor (helper) and as muhajirin (khorij). Each 
member of the family le  behind during Khuruj will be a shared responsibility 
for the Tablighi members in their area to provide assistance. Each week 
alternately congregations who do not go out will visit families to help their 
needs. Usually congregations bring rice, money and other food to provide for 
the family le  during Khuruj. Nushroh program can be a quick solution to 
help families economically strapped because of being le  for khuruj.
New perspectives established by the Tablighi in conjunction with Khuruj is 
to straighten faith of the community that has not recognized or deviate from 
the teachings of Islam.  e growing belief in the community is that property 
and other needs come from a husband, not Allah.  is indirectly aff ects the 
excessive dependence of the wife on the husband, and not on Allah.  is 
deviation to the Tablighi can only be changed through khuruj, where the wife 
le  during Khuruj must be trained independently and should be capable of 
running her own life with her children at home without being accompanied 
by her husband.  e wife is required to adapt to her husband’s new life by 
removing dependence on him.  ey take care of their own children to school, 
keep the farm, earn money and are responsible for everything during her 
husband’s khuruj.
CONFLICT NARRATIVES OF THE TABLIGHI FOLLOWERS
In addition to bringing peace in their message, the Tablighi also bring con  ict 
and discord in the family and society.  is is a consequence of the mission of 
dakwa movement brought to the middle of a family tradition and a pluralistic 
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society of multi-culture. In the internal family, for example, con  icts between 
husband and wife is no longer a public secret when a husband joins the Tablighi, 
without telling his wife in advance. Total changes shown by the husband a er 
joining the Tablighi usually shocks his wife.  e wife has to adjust and change 
the pattern of her life to compensate for the new lifestyle of her husband who 
is more focused on religion. A wife who understands will usually be happy to 
see the change in her husband who has received guidance to learn religion. 
 e husband who used to worship less, a er joining the Tablighi, worship 
more o en and have stronger faith.  is is the   gure of an ideal husband a 
wife is expected to have to guide them to the straight path.
 is subsection will focus on the narratives of con  ict and social friction that 
occur in the family and society. Diverse narratives appear related to the con  ict 
they face. Rahmat, one of the members of the Tablighi said that it had been nearly 
three years since he was dumped by her wife’s family for joining the Tablighi. 
Since joining the Tablighi, he showed a change in attitude, and he was expelled 
by his in-laws out of his home and had to sleep in the mosque with the a few 
pieces of clothes.  e resistance of the wife and the family could be stopped 
as the change in Rahmat’s attitude that no longer cared about his family. Since 
joining the Tablighi, he had to change his appearance from clothing (wearing 
gamis), way of eating, taking care of the body, growing beard to imitate the 
Sunnah of the Prophet. Despite resistance and protest, Rahmat believed that 
his wife and family had not received guidance from Allah so it was normal 
that they resisted him. He believed if his wife had received guidance then her 
behavior would change.  ey will accept a new lifestyle and join him later. His 
wife did not dare to sleep alone because she was not accustomed to. For three 
years, the household never got along and almost broke up, slowly she regained 
consciousness and began to accept his dakwa activities. Another narration of 
Imron, who burned his wife’s clothes because they looked ‘sexy’ and exposed 
private parts. He did this a er entering the Tablighi and thought of his wife’s 
behavior being the behavior of the devil that is not in accordance with the 
teachings of the religion of Allah. He started from the change in himself, then 
his family in order to revolutionize their mentality. He began to   x the clothes, 
the nature and character of his wife that violate the rules of Islam. Seeing the 
change in the attitude of the husband, his wife immediately responded that 
she could not accept her husband’s actions. She was screaming, rolling on the 
streets and depressed, while he tried to hold back and not too bothered by 
his wife’s action because in his view she was possessed by Satan.  is event 
caused the people in the village shocked and wondered why his wife suddenly 
acted like that. Imron let these things happen and still went out for Khuruj    
sabilillah with con  dence that Allah will change the attitude and behavior of 
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his wife at any time if she gets guidance. He believes all of this is a result of not 
opening the door of Allah’s guidance. A er four months of dakwa in East Java 
without giving news to his wife, someone called him and said that his wife had 
worn a hijab. He could not believe it how she could change drastically, while 
he had not preached on her. However he was convinced that his prayers were 
answered by Allah. Not long a er that he got news that she started to wear a 
purdah. He saw this phenomenon as a miracle, all of this could not be forced 
and all arranged by Allah.  e dakwa activities of Imron are getting easier 
because his wife began to support him. Once returning home to his wife, the 
intensity of ‘makomi’ dakwa performed by Imron further strengthened his 
wife’s belief to join the Tablighi.  ey are both now very active and o en go 
out for dakwa (masthuroh).
Another narrative concerns the family of Ahmad as his wife asked for a 
divorce if he continued the dakwa in the Tablighi. His wife was very depressed 
to see the changes in his behavior that was no longer concerned with the 
employment and education of children. Her husband was only concerned 
with dakwa. During her husband’s Khuruj, she had to handle all her husband’s 
duties and responsibilities including taking care of business and taking the 
children to school. She gave an ultimatum to the husband to quit the Tablighi 
or to have a divorce. Another story that emerged was a   ght between husband 
and wife because the husband sold their assets for dakwa needs. Zainudin, 
another member of the Tablighi who originated from Lombok mortgaged 
his land to preach abroad. His wife could not bear the economic pressure, so 
divorce was the only way out for this couple.
Abu Nizom had a diff erent experience where all his family opposed and 
pressed him against going out for dakwa. He planned to perform Khuruj 
for 10 days as scheduled, but had to accept the fact that at the time his wife 
was sick and the tobacco harvest from his farm had not been completed. His 
decision to go out for dakwa had caused his parents to be angry as his wife 
was sick and the tobacco harvest neglected. His father then went out to   nd 
Abu Nizom and found him in a mosque. He challenged his son to   ght if he 
insisted on continuing with the dakwa. Seeing his father’s attitude, Abu Nizom 
could only asked for forgiveness from Allah. Finally he relented and returned 
home to leave the arena of dakwa. He did not have much choice because of 
family pressures that forced him to return home.
External con  icts with the public are also a major problem faced by the Tablighi. 
Con  icts arise when they are dealing with people who do not understand the 
religious culture of the Tablighi.  e story of the rejection of the presence of 
the Tablighi in mosques is a common story that happens everywhere. Local 
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communities reject the use of mosques in their area as a center of the Tablighi 
dakwa activities as it is deemed to ‘contaminate’ the mosque. To carry out 
the mission of dakwa, the Tablighi not only make the mosque as a place of 
worship, but also as a place to stay for dakwa.  ey sleep, wash, cook and eat 
in the mosque. Local people worry that sleeping in the mosque will have an 
impact on the cleanliness of the mosque, and could then cancel the validity 
of prayer as their saliva may fall on the praying mat. Although the Tablighi 
always keep clean, not all can accept their presence.
Cooking in the mosque with a stove gives an impression of the mosque being 
used as a ‘religious camping’. Likewise, eating in the mosque is considered 
less suitable. People who are not accustomed to seeing this scene may feel 
uncomfortable. In addition, washing and drying clothes make the atmosphere 
of the mosque unpleasant to look at.  e issue whether to accept or reject the 
Tablighi who wish to deliver Khuruj in their mosque is quite dilemmatic. In 
Samarinda, some mosques shut down their door to the Tablighi movement, 
including the grand mosque and Islamic Center of Samarinda which serve the 
center of social and religious activities of Muslims in East Kalimantan.  e 
mosques belonging to certain organizations such as Muhammadiyah mosque 
and Sala   mosque also   rmly reject the Tablighi.
 e Jaulah method of dakwa of the Tablighi by knocking at the doors of homes 
also became a hot issue in the community. Some residents on Jl. Suryanata 
Samarinda for example, close the door of their home when the Tablighi come 
to preach on them.  ey feel that there is coercion and interference with 
the free exercise of religious worship practices.  ey are also considered to 
interfere with the stability of the activities of citizens as the group members 
suddenly come to preach.  e Tablighi were attacked by the villagers when 
they performed Khuruj in an area in East Java. A group of residents were not 
happy with their mission as it was seen to disturb the tranquility of citizens. 
 ey were besieged inside the mosque and intimidated, but because of the 
help of Allah they survived.  ey relented and were immediately evacuated 
from the mosque.
 e bombing case that occurred in the tourist island of Bali in 2002 directly 
had an impact on the Tablighi. Some residents claimed that they were part of 
a terrorist movement because of their clothes and appearance that look like a 
terrorist.  e Tablighi followers had diffi  culties to go abroad for dakwa.  ey 
were intercepted and interrogated intensely at each airport.  eir passports 
were con  scated and not allowed to continue   ying abroad.  is accusation was 
exaggerated because not everyone involved wearing big clothes and growing 
beard are terrorists.  e Tablighi members just fall victim to local politics a er 
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the attacks in Bali in 2002 and 2005 that killed tourists from foreign countries. 
 e Tablighi tried hard to recover the image and accusations directed to them 
through the teachings of anti political campaign and just focusing on religious 
dakwa.
Con  icts between the Tablighi and the Wahabi also occurred in several regions 
in Indonesia, including Samarinda.  e Wahhabis accused the Tablighi of 
doing bid’ah.  e Khuruj pattern with a certain period of time, such as 3 days, 
10 days, 40 days and 4 months, in the views of the Wahhabis, has no basis in the 
Quran and Hadith. Abu Mussab Wajdi Akkari, Wahhabi   gure in his speech 
said that the pattern of dakwa of the Tablighi has been categorized as heresy, 
even the Tablighi has become a new religion because members must follow 
with urgent situations.  e Wahhabis also view the Tablighi as not having 
adequate intellectual culture because they negates the discussion of mazhab 
and theology. Science and religious discourse of the Tablighi are shallow as 
it approaches the anti mazhab.  e Tablighi also claimed to not follow the 
practice of companions of the Prophet and misunderstood the motion dakwa. 
Akkari also regarded the Tablighi as not appreciating the diff erences,  and 
their kindness is gone when they disagree with other groups. 
Sheikh Assim Al Hakim, a Wahhabi cleric claimed that the Tablighi had no 
clear reference when performing Khuruj    sabilillah.  ey are considered 
heretical because they created their own practice of worship not based on 
the Quran and Hadith. “ e book they use among others, Fadoilul Amal, is 
less quali  ed because many hadiths quoted are invalid,” said Al-Hakim.  is 
piece of works is not comparable to the previous works of the imams.  is 
debate has triggered a lot con  icts with the Wahhabis who always attacked 
them with regard to the religious basis used.  e Tablighi are also considered 
deviant because they do not care about their families and too busy doing 
dakwa outside their neighborhood, while the congregation around them are 
not involeved in their dakwa. 
CONCLUSION
 e Tablighi play an important role in the dakwa movement at the local and 
global level as a middle path in the midst of the cold social relations between 
Muslim groups because they are stuck in the mazhab debate. Muslims split due 
to diff erences in mazhab, sects and ideological diff erences in the organizations, 
sometimes even ending up with con  ict and social violence. In addition, a 
con  ict of mazhab is intervened with political and economic interests which 
will certainly add to the complexity of the problems.  e Tablighi’s constructive 
eff orts of ‘demazhabization’ of Islam by taking  the religion away from the 
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context of the debate is a breakthrough of solution.  e Tablighi do not look 
at the background of mazhab, sects or ideology of their members, but on the 
contrary, they accommodate and integrate them into a universal movement. 
 e Tablighi opened the door wide and seek to bring together all the elements 
of Muslims to join in their dakwa movement.  e Tablighi at times act as a 
large umbrella for groups that are members of community organizations or 
institutions that participate in their mission.
 e Tablighi are not part of the Sala   or Wahabi which has been widely claimed 
by the community.  e Tablighi also are not mass organizations, institutions, or 
organizations but an embryo of the dakwa movement which is a modi  cation 
of the various thareqats namely Al-Jistiyah, Naqsabandiyah, Qadariyah dan 
As-Sahrowardiyah.  e four thareqats have been developed, reconstructed 
and reformed to be  areqat Nabawi which emphasizes on dakwa. According 
to Sheikh Ilyas, thareqat is meaningless if it only brightens the individual 
spirituality, while the other Muslim societies are still in the dark.  erefore, 
the only way is to preach to the society.  e Tablighi through  areqat Nabawi 
focus on dakwa activities at home and abroad.  ey positioned the religion 
as an endeavor and dakwa as an activity that need to be done continuously. 
Dakwa is one of the activities of Prophet Muhammad and his companions 
who never stopped preaching and at any time and any place.
Full concentration on religious dakwa programs such as Khuruj    sabilillah 
has given birth to the concept of ‘Divinity economy’ within the Tablighi. 
Although they use only 10% for the activities for dakwa (3/month, 40/year 
and 4/lifetime), but the impact is huge on the existence of economic families 
where the Tablighi are no longer productive in   nding sustenance and submit 
economic matter entirely to Allah.  e Tablighi are not so concerned with 
the family’s economy because they are sure that Allah will guarantee and give 
sustenance to those who fought in His path. Worldly obsession to the Tablighi 
is a disease that must be removed and transformed into the obsession of the 
herea er.  e world is only temporary and does not need to be glori  ed, in 
contrast to the Herea er is lasting and tangible. If the intention of the struggle 
and dakwa has been made, money and one’s own family’s needs will come 
from Allah. Allah will send help through other people.  is Tablighi argument 
serves the basis for me to coin the term ‘Divinity economy’ in the Tablighi 
ideology that only relies on Allah’s power.
 e Tablighi dakwa is a mission of peace and uni  cation of Muslims. However, 
in reality, they face a variety of con  icts both in the family and community. 
Most families of those who joined the Tablighi had diffi  culties due to economic 
problems and the principle of family life that had to adapt to the pattern of 
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the Tablighi dakwa. Family economic crisis cannot be avoided in the family 
institution as the Tablighi do not have an obsession to pursue the world, while 
the needs of their own families and the needs of dakwa are quite demanding. 
 ey have to spend money on transportation costs and meals for dakwa 
outside the region and abroad.  e dakwa needs are quite demanding for 
the Tablighi, let alone providing for the family. Unlike the Tablighi members 
who are richer, they are not diffi  cult to cover the family’s needs.  e nushroh 
program is one solution to overcome economic hardship of families during the 
trip, where ther members who are not doing dakwa will help them. However, 
nushroh is only temporary because a er khuruj a husband must think of his 
family’s economic life.
In addition to family con  icts, the Tablighi also face a con  ict with 
the community which becomes the object of their mission. People feel 
uncomfortable with the pattern of dakwa of the Tablighi where they knock at 
the doors of their homes because it is regarded as coercion and intervention in 
the private area. Residents also do not want them use the mosque as a place to 
stay for dakwa because it can contaminate and disrupt the residents’ worship 
activities. Islamic organizations, especially the Wahhabis, are very keen on 
preaching that the Tablighi are misguided because they  have created new rules 
of worship that did not exist in the days of the Prophet. Provisions of time in 
dakwa never existed in the days of the Prophet, if you have the opportunity 
to preach anywhere and anytime.  ese con  icts for the Tablighi only a trial 
from Allah that must be faced. the Tablighi sure that this problem occurs as 
people have not blessed with guidance from Allah.
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